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I.
At the last Conference of the International Law Association,
held at Christiania in September, 1905, Professor Oscar Platou pre-
sented an interesting paper on the legal relations between charterers
and shipowners. He proposed as a matter for discussion a resolu-
tion passed by the Commercial Congress in Copenhagen in 1903,
which was to the following effect:
"That efforts should be made to pass a law, which should enact:
"That all contract clauses in bills of lading, charter-parties and
similar agreements respecting maritime conveyance, purporting to
limit or nullify the ordinary rules of law respecting the liability f
shipowners for due care in providing for the seaworthiness, the out-
fit, manning and provisioning of the vessel, and likewise in the recep-
tion, stowing, dunnaging, separation and delivery of the goods, shall
be invalid, whether the contracts be made here or abroad, and even
when reference is made in such documents to foreign laws or
customs."
He added that there would be no objection to make stipulations
in such a law, as has been done in the Harter Act, once for all reliev-
ing the owners of liability in respect of the so-called nautical
errors-that is, errors on the part of the masters and crews with
respect to navigation; but so that it be sharply and precisely defined
that the owner's liability for proper treatment of the goods will in no
way be affected thereby.
In the course of the ensuing debate, Mr. Douglas Owen
expressed himself to the effect that he personally should rejoice to
see legislation on lines similar to the Harter Act introduced into
British legislation. But, he said, it was scarcely probable that the
British legislature could be induced to interfere until there hap-
pened certain strong cases appealing strongly to the public sense of
right and justice, which might call for legislation in the sense indi-
cated by Mr. Platou. Until then, he thinks, we shall have to make
* This paper was read by Dr. Sieveking at the Berlin Conference of the
International Law Association, Oct. 5, 19o6. [ED.]
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up our minds to go on as we are going. And what he would like to
see was an alternative bill of lading-the one bill of lading much on
the present lines, in which the shipowner is liable for nothing except
to receive his freight in advance; the other, in which, in considera-
tion of a higher freight, the shipowner accepts liability for damages
arising out of ill-treatment of the cargo. A resolution was then sub-
mitted to the conference, to the effect:
"That there is a demand for compulsory clauses in charter-
parties in the same direction as those indicated in the United States
Harter Act with regard to the legal relations between charterer and
shipowner."
Twelve votes were given in favor of this resolution and twelve
against it, whereupon the resolution was lost by the casting vote of
the chairman.
This result of the debate shows that the important questions
which formed the subject of the discussion have as yet not met with
a decisive solution, and this circumstance alone would suffice to jus-
tify another word on the subject. Another reason for my taking up
the discussion is that it seems expedient to bring to the knowledge
of this association two facts, which, it is true, have been alluded to
already at the Christiania meeting, but which deserve a somewhat
more extensive explanation.
II.
The first of these facts is the result of an International Confer-
ence of Underwriters, held in Paris in i9oo. This conference was
attended by a great number of representatives of marine insurance
companies from Paris, Havre, Hamburg, London, Berlin, Mann-
heim, Milan, Liverpool, Copenhagen, Antwerp, St. Petersburg,
Gothenburg, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Turin, Ble,
Zurich. In his address to the conference the president pointed out
that, in consequence of the underwriters having accepted their lia-
bility for damages to or loss of goods shipped under bills of lading
which contain the negligence clause and the other usual exonerating
clauses, the insurance on goods, whose original purpose was to cover
accidents of the sea only and accidents of navigation arising out of
faults of master and crew, had come to protect the shipowner against
"commercial faults" committed by his agents and employees in the
fulfilment of contracts entered into by the shipowner. This exten-
sion of liabilities, so the president argued, ought to be abolished
because it led to this, that the fulfilment of contracts which were des-
tined to secure a safe transportation of goods was neglected, and the
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responsibility for the carrying out of such contracts was taken off
the shoulders of those to whom in law and equity it should attach.
The result of this conference was that a resolution was unani-
mously adopted to the following effect:
"The conference resolves that in policies on goods the following
clause be inserted:
"The insurers on goods do not take at their charge the conse-
quences of clauses inserted in bills of lading or charter-parties which
relieve the shipowner from his liabilty for commercial faults of mas-
ter and crew, such as are referred to in the United States law called
the Harter Act of 13th February, 1893.
"The insurers accept the clause exonerating the shipowner from
nautical faults committed in the navigation of the vessel."
Moreover, it has been unanimously resolved to establish com-
mittees at the different local centers of marine insurance business,
with a view to communicate with each other, and jointly to examine
all questions of common interest, as well as to realize the execution
of the adopted resolution.
The carrying out of the aforesaid resolution has been postponed
for a short time, in order to await the result of a movement which
shortly afterwards was brought about with the view of inducing
legislatures to interfere.
This movement is the other fact of importance in the considera-
tion of the questions with which I am dealing.
III.
In a Conference of French Shippers held at Marseilles in Octo-
ber, 19o2, certain resolutions were adopted, which, later on, were
adhered to by a large number of French Chambers of Commerce and
other bodies representing various merchants and mercantile societies
of France. These resolutions recommended the adoption of a law
allowing shipowners to decline their liability for nautical faults of
master and crew, and prohibiting them from declining such liability
for commercial faults of the shipowners' employees in the carrying
out of affreightment contracts.
A mixed committee, consisting of French shippers and ship-
owners, met at Paris in May, 1903, to consider the question. In
this committee the shipowners brought forward a proposal which
had already been made by the Delegates of the Syndicates of French
Shipowners as far back as 1896, viz.: an alternative bill of lading,
the one containing the full legal liability of the shipowner; the other
containing the exonerating clauses. The former to be handed to
the shipper, as a rule, in case of no special agreement as to the
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freight having been made; the latter to be framed according to the
special stipulations agreed upon.
This system of a double bill of lading has been actually put into
practice by some French shipowners. But it appears that French
shippers seldom choose the bill of lading containing the full liability,
but generally prefer the bill of lading charged with the exonerating
clauses. This seems to be the natural consequence of the fact that
as long as the shippers are protected by insurance there is no reason
for them to refuse the bill of lading with exonerating clauses.
The shippers, not being satisfied with the offer made by the ship-
owners, continued their efforts to bring about an intervention of
legislation, and in February, 19o4, an interministerial committee was
appointed by the French government, and ordered to examine
whether it was advisable to modify the existing French law with
regard to bills of lading. The committee met under the presidency
of Mr. Durand, member of the French Cour de Cassation, and con-
tained ten other distinguished lawyers, government officials and
merchants. The committee has heard the views of Delegates of
French Shippers, Delegates of the Central Committee of French
Shipowners and Delegates of French Underwriters.
The shippers accepted the clauses exonerating the owner from
liability for neglects and defaults of master and crew in navigating
the vessel and the underwriters declared their willingness to submit
to such clauses. So far as these clauses were concerned there
appeared to be no reason for a change of the existing law, which
allows the inserting of such clauses in charter-parties or bills of
lading.
Difference of opinion, however, arose as to the liability for so-
called commercial faults of master and crew and other employees of
shipowners. The shippers objected to the clauses exonerating the
shipowners from liability for loss or damage of goods caused by
negligent storage, by theft, or by the neglect of proper care in the
fulfilment of such duties as in all contracts must be performed by
paid employees. They argued that by these clauses negligence was
encouraged, that in fact they amounted to a premium on negligence,
and even on fraud. They declared that it was contrary to law and
equity, that shipowners should be allowed to leave the goods on
quays or in lighters, before shipment or after discharging, at the risk
of the shippers or consignees, for a certain time, say for the interval
between the departure of one vessel and that of the next following of
the same line; and further objected that shipowners, by clauses in
the bills of lading, were allowed to keep goods on board for several
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successive voyages, or to discharge them at a port beyond the port
of destination, and to return them at the risk of the shippers or con-
signees, instead of properly delivering them at the port of destina-
tion; that clauses in the bills of lading allowed the shipowners to
tranship the goods into other vessels, even foreign, and not belong-
ing to their own line, and of an inferior class, and without notice to
the parties interested-to load goods on deck without notice given
to the shipper-to bring into general average damages suffered by
engines and expenses of lighterage caused by the vessel coming
aground without an imminent peril-to limit their liability arising
out of belated delivery to cases of a delay exceeding three or four
months, and to a certain low amount-and generally to decline all
and every liability for faults and neglects of their employees, master
and crew or others.
The shippers also represented to the committee that they were
unable to make agreements to a contrary effect, owing to the power
of the shipowners and their faculty of combining amongst them-
selves; that part of the enumerated risks, e. g., the risk of delay in
delivery, could even now not be covered by insurance, and that if the
resolutions taken at the Underwriters' Conference at Paris in I9OO
were put into effect they would be unable to protect themselves by
insurance against all those risks. Further, that, apart from this, it
was no argument against their reasoning to say that they could pro-
tect themselves by insurance against wrongs illegally suffered by
them, and that it would be unjust to say that without an interna-
tional agreement the question could not be settled in the way pro-
posed by them because the experience of the Harter Act showed
that national legislation could interfere without any prejudice to the
interests of the national shipowners. On the contrary, the continu-
ance of the present state of affairs would seriously prejudice the
interests of the national shipowners because the shippers would be
led to prefer the flags of such countries where clauses of the nature
described were not in use.
The underwriters on cargo, in a memorandum presented to the
committee, declared that, although they took a lively interest in the
debate because whatever served to diminish their risk would only be
welcome to them, still their position was simply this, that if the
movement proved abortive, they would put into practice the resolu-
tions adopted at the Paris Conference in igoo, and thus free them-
selves from liabilities which, according to law and to the nature of
marine insurance, ought to rest on the shipowners and not on the
underwriters on cargo.
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The shipowners gave the following reasons for opposing the
demands of the shippers. They said that they had offered the alter-
native bill of lading-the one covering the so-called commercial
faults of a somewhat higher freight-and that this was all the ship-
pers could in equity desire. If the shippers refused to accept this
offer, they would have to insure the risk of the clauses, and they cer-
tainly would be able to do it because the underwriters, owing to the
competition of foreign, especially British, insurers would never be
able to carry out their threats to discontinue the insurance of those
risks. If, on the other side, the proposed reform by legislation were
adopted, the French shipowners would be prejudiced in favor of the
underwriters, the greater part of whom, moreover, were foreign
underwriters, and of foreign shipowners. Finally the shippers
themselves would be the sufferers because by impeding the develop-
ment of export and import of goods from and into French ports they
would deprive themselves of facilities for procuring the goods
required for their industry and for creating markets for the sale of
the produce of their industry in foreign countries.
IV.
The committee, after a careful examination, arrived at the fol-
lowing conclusion:
"That it is not advisable to alter the actual law on bills of lading,
for the reasons: that public order does not in this respect require an
interference with the principle of liberty of contracts; that, in the
present condition of the relations of maritime commerce, it is always
possible to meet the inconveniences arising out of the irresponsi-
bility of shipowners, either by the alternative bill of lading, or by
insurance in its various forms; finally, and above all, that the pro-
posed reforms would lead to serious difficulties with regard to inter-
national law, and that, from a commercial point of view, they would
place the French shipowners in an evidently inferior position as
regards foreign shipowners, so that without the concurrence of all
other nations the proposed reform evidently cannot be realized."
The reasons by which the committee has been guided are laid
down in a report drawn up by Mr. Rousseau, Avocat A la Cour
d'Appel de Paris, dated Paris, March 19th, 19o6. The following is
an abstract of his report:
First of all there is no reason for an alteration of the law regard-
ing sailing-vessels because the complaints are made against the
steamship owners only, nor of the law regarding charter-parties
because the complainants themselves acknowledge that as far as
regards the negotiation of an affreightment by charter-party no
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protection of the merchant against the principle of liberty of con-
tracts is required. It is on bills of lading only that the dispute turns
because the merchants say that there is no possibility for them to
contest the bill of lading clauses, and that practically the shipowners
in this respect enjoy a monopoly.
It has then been considered that at present-with the sole excep-
tion of the United States and of Australia-the clauses of irrespon-
sibility are universally in use. This seems to prove that commercial
necessities have led to such a situation. It is a fact that in the
course of the last twenty or thirty years freights have gone down
very considerably, so much so that on some routes the freight is but
five per cent of what it was formerly. Besides this deterioration of
the position of a shipowner, the modern changes in navigation and
naval industry have brought about new risks. It is against these
risks that the shipowners want to protect themselves by the clauses
of irresponsibility. The proposed reform would enhance the risks
of the shipowner and lead to the necessity of their covering these
enhanced risks by insurance, and, in order to cover the costs of
insurance, to raise the freight rates. If they did not do so, they
would evidently be at a disadvantage compared with foreign ship-
owners. If they did so, French shippers would avail themselves of
foreign ships for transport of their goods, and thus contribute to ruin
the French commercial navy, or, if they did not do this, the increase
in the costs of exporting and importing goods would damage the
producing industry of the nation. Therefore it clearly appears that
the reforms, if necessary, could be brought about by international
legislation only, agreed upon by all, or at least the six or seven lead-
ing maritime nations.
The report then goes on to examine the difference between navi-
gation now and in former times. Formerly, the value of ships, as
well as cargoes, was vastly inferior to what it is now. Consequently
the risks incurred by the shipowners were less. Besides, vessels
now are of so complicated a structure and require such numerous
and often changing crews that the risk of accidents is increased and
the possibility of controlling the crews considerably impaired. Car-
goes must be stowed and discharged with an ever-increasing haste.
In intermediate ports the necessary shortness of the stay prevents a
careful control in the taking in and discharging of cargoes. The
work goes on day and night. Bad weather in open roadsteads aug-
ments the difficulties. Occasions are more numerous for theft and
damaging of goods. Shipmasters must be chosen amongst those
who have passed the examinations required by law; therefore, it
YALE LAW IOURNAL.
would be a hardship to make the owner liable for the master's man-
agement of commercial affairs to which he has not been educated.
As to the crew, they are not able to judge of what is required for a
safe navigation and for a proper stowage. As to short delivery of
goods, it must be taken into consideration that frequently shippers
pretended to have shipped goods which, in fact, had not been deliv-
ered on board, and that the master and crew of a vessel taking
in or discharging cargo out of four hatches are unable to control the
proper delivery. Lastly, it must not be overlooked that, notwith-
standing the clauses in the bills of lading, the shipowners often vol-
untarily agree to pay for damages or losses not covered by their
guarantee, so that the necessity of reform does not appear to be so
urgent as it is made by the shippers.
The so-called monopoly of the shipowners is next considered.
The committee were of opinion that the alleged monopoly did not
exist. The shippers can apply to other shipowners. They can, by
their combined efforts, start steamship companies themselves. It is
not true that the bills of lading are forced upon the merchants.
They are known to the merchants and are frequently modified. It
often happens that several steamship companies try to come into bus-
iness with a shipper of goods, and the shipper avails himself of this
competition in order to secure advantages for himself. The enor-
mous abatement of freights also proves that there is no monopoly
because, if the shipowners had a monopoly, they would have been able
to keep up the high freights. It is notorious that competition has
reduced the freights so much as, in many cases, scarcely to leave to
the shipowner the means of paying his expenses.
Then, as to the encouragement of negligence and fraud, the report
proceeds to say that this argument is not a sound one. Competition
is a sufficient safeguard against these dangers. The owner who
does not take care to prevent, as far as possible, the occurrence of
losses and damages will soon lose his clients. The exonerating
clauses do not make it to the interest of the shipowner to have the
goods lost or damaged. Negligence in the control of their employees
would make the shipowners liable, notwithstanding the clauses.
The committee, for these reasons, conclude that the principle of
public order does not require the prohibition of exonerating clauses.
The shipowner who confides his ship to the master risks the loss of
his ship; similarly the shipper risks the loss of the goods confided to
the master. The shipowner protects himself by insurance; simi-
larly the shipper may protect himself by insurance. If he chooses
not to do so, he is his own insurer.
32.
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A law which prohibits the exonerating clauses could not prevent
the consequence, viz.: the raising of freight rates in proportion to
the greater risks incurred by the shipowner. This surplus of freight
is equivalent to the insurance premium which the merchant has to
pay if the risks are not covered by the shipowner. It follows that
there is no sufficient reason for legislation instead of leaving the
solution of the conflict between the owner and the merchant to the
general law of economy. The legislator's duty is only to protect a
person who invokes his protection against fraud and the clauses of
irresponsibility cannot be considered to be a fraud to the prejudice of
the merchant.
At any rate, all reasonable demands of the shippers are met by
the offer of an alternative bill of lading. The surplus of freight
stipulated by a French steamship company, the "Compagnie de Nav-
igation Mixte," in 1897, amounted to Ofr. 88c. h. ifr. 54c. per cent
of the declared value, which seems to be but a moderate charge.
The report then proceeds to an examination of the Barter Act
and the Australian Act relating to the sea carriage of goods of 15th
December, 19o4, which is, on the whole, a reproduction of the Har-
ter Act with some slight alterations. The Harter Act, it is said,
leaving alone the wording of the law, which might be amended, can-
not be considered as an example which should be followed. The
conclusion drawn from the fact that the Barter Act has not injured
the development of the American trade or naval industry is not
decisive because there are many concurring and always-changing
reasons for this development between which it is hardly possible to
distinguish, so as to ascertain whether any and what part is attribu-
table to the law in question. It must be considered that the United
States law, previous to the passing of the Barter Act, held the ship-
owner responsible not only for the so-called commercial but also for
the nautical faults of the master and crew, and, therefore, in this
respect, the Barter Act alleviated the responsibility of the ship-
owner. The clause by which the Barter Act prohibits certain
exonerating clauses has in view, as is proved by the debates on the
Bill, to protect the American exporters of grain and flour against
foreign transporters so long as there is no American mercantile navy
to carry out these transports. The national flag of the United States
carries ten per cent only of their international sea transports. A
committee of members of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives has been appointed to suggest remedies, and has arrived at the
conclusion that subsidies were necessary to ameliorate the condition
of the American shipowners. It is, therefore, not advisable to intro-
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duce the legislation of the United States into countries where the
relations of commerce and navigation are entirely different from
those in .the United States.
Lastly, the question is considered from the point of view of the
underwriters. And here the committee comes to the conclusion
that, as far as the underwriters are concerned, the question simply
comes to this: "Who is to pay the premium of the risks, the ship-
owner or the shipper?" And this, the committee says, is a question
between private interests only, which does not justify the interfer-
ence of legislation in a sense contrary to the principle of liberty of
contracts.
V.
This report, of the main contents of which I have given a short
abstract, presents to our eyes a vivid picture of the stage at which
the movement which, for upwards of twenty years has engaged the
attention of the commercial world, has at present arrived. It intro-
duces the interested parties-the shippers, the shipowners, the under-
writers. We hear their arguments. We learn what judgment,
after the hearing. has been delivered by a body of eminent men
directed to investigate this question by the government of a com-
monwealth which takes the highest rank amongst civilized nations.
Thus we are enabled to form a judgment ourselves on a question
which, for a long series of years, has occupied the attention" of this
asociation also.
First of all,the question is formulated in a more precise form thar%
has been done before. The question is whether legislation ought to
interfere with the principle of liberty of contract by prohibiting
certain clauses in bills of lading issued by steamship companies.
There is no question about sailing-vessels; as to these no complaints
are made. There is no question about charter-parties; as to these,
also, no complaints are made. The clauses which are objected to by
the shippers can be particularly specified. They are not the clauses
which, since olden times, figure in the bills of lading, viz.: the
clauses, "the act of God, enemies, pirates, and perils of the seas
excepted," and the clauses, "weight and contents unknown." Nor
are they the more recent clause, "not responsible for fire on board,
collisions, strandings, explosions, or other accidents of navigation,
even when occasioned by negligence, default, or error in judgment
of the pilot, master, crew, or other servants of the shipowner, nor for
damage done on land, nor for obliteration, errors, insufficiency or
absence of marks, numbers, address, or description," or similar
clauses.
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The clauses objected to are those which exonerate the shipowner
from liability for loss or damage on goods arising from negligence,
fault, or failure of the master, officers, agents, or servants of the
owner in proper loading, stowage, dunnage, care, and proper deliv-
ery of goods committed to their charge. In other words: "The
shippers want the owner to be and remain responsible for all losses
and damages on goods happening in the time between their delivery
to the master, or officers, or servants of the owner, and the delivery
to the consignee, except such as result from acts of God, or accidents
of navigation, even if caused by the negligence of the master, officers
and crews, or pilots, or other persons employed by the owner in the
navigation of the vessel."
Thus the owner would be responsible for thefts, for want of due
custody whilst the goods received are stored in sheds or lighters
before being charged on board or delivered to the consignee, for bad
stowage and dunnage, for want of proper care in ventilating during
the voyage, for wrong delivery or non-delivery or late delivery at the
port of destination, for the risks of transhipment, and for loading
goods on deck without previous agreement with the shipper.
The question, therefore, is: Whether it is desirable to bring
about a law which compels the shipowners to bear these responsi-
bilities.
It seems to be clear that such a law, if given, could not be given
by a single nation, but must be an international law. The ship-
owners, if prohibited from declining the responsibilities in question,
must be allowed to raise their freights. This would prejudice the
national merchant navy of the particular state. An agreement
between the seafaring nations-at least, the principal amongst
them-would, therefore, be indispensable.
This, however, is no reason for not trying to bring about an
international law. The question, therefore, remains the same as
stated above, only that the words, "an international law," must be
substituted for the term, "a law," used above.
The only reason, in my opinion, why such a law could be deemed
advisable, would be this-that the principle of public order required
the law. This could be said only, if public interests suffered in the
present state of things. This would be the case, if disorders of a
public character-crimes or fraud-were the consequence of the
present state of things, and could be prevented or diminished by
passing such a law, or if the law were necessary or, at least, useful
for preventing a loss of national wealth which arises from the pres-
ent state of things.
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Both arguments, indeed, are brought forward by the partisans of
the proposed reform. It is said that thefts and embezzlement of
cargoes are encouraged by the masters and crews knowing that their
owner cannot be held responsible, and therefore will not dismiss
them on account of their misdemeanors. Professor Platou mentions
the case of the steamship, "General Goridon," which arrived at St.
Nazaire with a cargo of wheat, part of which was discharged, but
the remainder clandestinely taken away to sea by the master. And
it is said that the negligence of the owner's servants in handling the
cargo is encouraged by the negligence clause, and thus values are
lost which form a part of the national wealth. It is also said that
the bills of lading are discredited by the negligence clause.
These arguments, in my opinion, are not of a nature to justify the
proposed legislation. To support them, it must be proved that
thefts and embezzlements have increased in number in consequence
of the introduction of the negligence clause, and that, by prohibiting
this clause, they will diminish. This, as yet, has not been proved.
It also seems to be highly improbable that the crew of a steamship
will be prevented from committing a theft by reflecting that, by com-
mitting such a crime, they will damage the owner. The master of
the "General Gordon" would have sailed with the cargo just as well,
if the negligence clause had not been inserted in the bill of lading.
Nor can it be said that the negligence clause encourages masters
and crews to commit thefts and embezzlements by leading them to
think that the owner will not dismiss them because he suffers no
damage. For every steamship company will most certainly dismiss
such rogues, whether they be responsible for the damage done by
them or not. And as to the credit of the bills of lading, it would
have to be proved that the bankers who give their acceptance against
bills of lading covered by insurance policies-and other bills of lad-
ing, as far as my knowledge goes, are not presented to bankers-dis-
tinguish between bills of lading without a negligence clause and bills
of lading with a negligence clause. This proof, as yet, has not been
given. Then there is the negligence in stowing the cargo, in pro-
viding proper dunnage, and caring for the cargo during the voyage,
c. g., by ventilation. It must be granted that the stowage, the dun-
nage, and the care for the cargo, will be better attended to, if the
stevedores and the people on board know that the owners must pay
for the want of such attention. But, in order to justify legislation
to interfere, more than this is required. It must be shown that a
waste of goods is, in fact, caused by bad stowage, or dunnage, and
bad ventilation, and that the owners do not do their utmost to pre-
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vent such waste. The former fact has, as yet, not been proved, and,
as to the latter, experience, as far as I know, shows that the big
steamship companies all over the world do what is in their power to
provide means for a careful handling of the cargo, as well as for
good stowage and proper dunnage.
There is another question which must be considered with regard
to the stowage, dunnage, and the handling of the cargo during the
-voyage. Do not these duties of the master and officers belong to
what is called navigation, and is not, therefore, a neglect of these
duties an error or neglect of navigation, and, as such, part of the
clauses which are admitted by the merchants? What is the differ-
ence between a master who endangers the cargo by neglecting care-
fully to supervise the stowage, or to care for a proper dunnage, and
a master who endangers the cargo by not making a careful use of
the log, or between an officer who omits to have a cargo of grain
properly ventilated, and an officer who omits to have the hatches
properly secured?
The same or similar reasons apply to the losses or damage on
cargo which happen in sheds or lighters before coming on board or
before being landed after their discharge. The modern mode of
conducting the business of steamship lines is entirely different from
what was done some thirty or forty years ago. The steamers are
run in a certain line, goods are engaged for this line beforehand; the
owners cannot guarantee the shipping of the goods at a certain time
or with a certain vessel. The goods, therefore, must frequently be
stored before shipment. The owners provide storage in public
sheds or in sheds of their own. Likewise the cargo cannot be taken
in or discharged in the same way as it was formerly. It must be
brought alongside the vessel by lighters, or discharged into lighters.
Or the prompt expedition of steamers, which benefits the whole com-
mercial public, requires the landing of cargoes on quays before the
consignees are ready to receive their goods. The goods are received
by the steamship line before they come on board. Bills of lading
are signed: "Received to be shipped on board." It is clear that,
thus, greater risks are run by the cargo during the time between the
receipt by the vessel and the delivery to the consignee than at times
when the bill of lading was only signed, "Received on board," and
the cargo was taken from on board alongside the vessel. But, on
the other hand, considerable advantages accrue to the merchants out
of such a mode of conducting business. They save expenditure by
having the goods stored in sheds of the steamship companies. They
receive bills of lading sooner. They have not to provide the lighter-
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age for discharging the cargo. Under these circumstances, why
should legislation prohibit the shipowner from saying: "Those extra
risks must be borne by the merchant-they are not covered by the
freight?" I cannot see that the principle of public interest is
involved in this question.
The clause of transhipment, also, is justified by these reasons.
And as to the non-delivery of goods at the port of destination and
returning them by other vessels, it must be granted that this may
happen by carelessness of the master or officers; but it may happen,
also, through inadvertency of the shipper in properly marking the
goods and the port of destination, and the short time of stay at inter-
mediate ports in 'some degree excuses the mistakes. At any rate, no
general public interest of importance is involved in this clause, as
well as in the clause limiting the amount for which the owners are
responsible in case of non-delivery or belated delivery, so as to jus-
tify the interference of legislation.
This, also, seems to be the case with deck loads. The merchants
complain that goods are charged on deck without previous advertise-
ment to the shipper. But, although it is true that bills of lading
often contain the clause, "the vessel to be at liberty to stow goods on
deck," still the merchant, who must know the form of the bills of
lading, can easily avoid any risk by stipulating, on advising the ship-
ment to the agent of the steamship company, that the goods are to be
stowed below deck, or, if not, that he be informed in time to pro-
cure a proper insurance for them.
It needs no explanation that a clause which allows the owner to
bring into general average damages done to the engines by the ves-
sels going aground without an imminent peril is of no public interest
whatever.
Lastly, it is said that legislation must forbid the owners to decline
their liability for the neglect of all such duties as are performed by
their paid employees. "Respondeat superior." But clearly this is
no argument for the interference of legislation. Reasons of public
policy only can justify this interference. It is said that the nature of
the contract of affreightment involves the necessity of the said lia-
bility. But this is evidently erroneous because there is nothing to
hinder making a contract which differs from the contracts of
affreightment defined by law.
As to the alleged monopoly of steamship companies, it may be
granted that merchants frequently are compelled to submit to the
conditions of the bills of lading. But only, if they do not offer a
higher freight. Before it can be said that the shipowners take
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undue advantage of their position, it must be proved that they refuse
to increase their liability in consideration of a higher freight. This
proof is, as yet, not given. The offer of an alternative bill of lading,
made by the French steamship companies, is strong evidence to the
contrary.
The result is that, for the present, at least, there is no reason for
advocating legislative action in imitation of the Harter Act. Such
legislation would be welcomed, certainly, by the underwriters on
cargo. But it is evident that legislation cannot be invoked to
improve the business of underwriters. If the risks are greater than
formerly, the premiums must be raised. And the attitude of the
underwriters at the above-mentioned Paris Conference-an
attitude, which, naturally, will result in a raising of insurance pre-
miums and not in making insurance impossible-seems to me to be
fully justified if the present premiums are too low. But this is not
a matter of public order, and, consequently, it affords no reason for
interference by legislation.
VI.
If I am right thus far, the question for this association remains:
Ought the Harter Act and bills of lading legislation to be dropped
out of the programme of the International Law Association alto-
gether?
I think not. It is true, as Sir Walter Phillimore remarked at the
Christian Conference, that the general bill of lading proposed by the
association at its London Conference in 1893 has fallen stillborn.
But this only proves that it is impossible to draft a bill of lading
which suits all interests concerned, and is adapted to all the ever-
changing requirements of maritime commerce. It is not impossible,
however, that abuses may arise -which show the necessity of legisla-
tion. And it is possible, also, that iniquities may occur which could
be successfully met by repeated discussions in meetings like those of
this association. It is highly desirable that the commercial public
shall know that the conferences of this association afford an oppor-
tunity of a public discussion on any well-founded complaints on the
contents of bills of lading, and that it may be induced to communi-
cate to this association any well-founded complaints which they may
have to make. Dr. F. Sieveking.
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